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Abstract: The existence of adversarial countervailing power has been considered
a necessary condition to making collaborative governance fair and effective.
However, adversarial countervailing power cannot be easily transformed into a
collaborative one that is more appropriate for collaborative governance. This article
explores a mechanism of power transformation by bridging the theory of trust
building and the theory of power in collaborative governance. This article posits
that when there is distrust among parties, comprehensive, up-front prenegotiation
on the structure of collaboration may set the stage for a small-wins approach to
trust building by managing power imbalances. Power transformation may follow
this trust-building cycle accordingly. The framework of power transformation 
is tested with the case of the Shi-Hwa Sustainable Development Committee, a
successful experiment of collaborative governance in balancing development and
environment in Korea in which adversarial countervailing power was transformed
into a collaborative one. The results of this article imply that a key factor in 
successful collaborative governance is power management.
Keywords: Collaborative governance, adversarial countervailing power, trust
building
INTRODUCTION
Collaborative governance can be defined as “a governing arrangement where one or
more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-
making process that is formal, consensus oriented, and deliberative and that aims to
make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (Ansell &
Gash, 2008, p. 544). Much of the literature identifies power imbalances among the
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parties as a commonly noted problem in collaborative governance, since power imbal-
ances tend to discourage the parties from engaging in collaborative processes at the
outset (Imperial, 2005; O’Toole & Meier, 2004; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987; Warner,
2006), favor entrenched and concentrated parties (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2001;
Leach, 2006; Yaffee & Wondolleck, 2003), and produce distrust and dictating more
adversarial behaviors among stakeholders (Calton & Lad, 1995; Lane & Bachmann,
1998; Vangen & Huxham, 2003).
Much of the literature on collaborative governance thus likewise suggests that 
the existence of countervailing power may help to make collaboration fair, effective,
and sustainable, since it can reduce, and even neutralize, the problems of power 
imbalances through a variety of mechanisms (Fung & Wright, 2003; Mitchell, 2005;
Purdy, 2012). The term “countervailing power,” firstly formulated by John Kenneth
Galbraith (1952) to describe the power of trade unions, citizen’s organizations, and so
on to offset business’s excessive advantage, means here a form of power that develops
to counter some well-established form of power advantage.
The forms of countervailing power, however, are likely to become excessively
adversarial in confrontation with dominant and established forms of power. Conven-
tional power balance processes that occur in the negotiation of controversial public
issues, such as, for example, local sustainability, are often the stage for interest group
politics, litigation, or social mobilization. The problem is that the forms and cognitive
frames of adversarial countervailing power are not effective in bringing about successful
collaboration. Different forms and cognitive frames of countervailing power, so-called
collaborative countervailing power, are necessary for successful collaboration (Fung
& Wright, 2003).
Adversarial countervailing power, however, cannot easily be converted to collabo-
rative purposes due to several inherent barriers (Fung & Wright, 2003). Large organi-
zations that possess adversarial countervailing power tend to engage in national or
high-level policy rather than in local, practical problem-solving efforts. Also, their
cognitive frames often involve narratives of inequity and disrespect, in other words,
“injustice frames.” These frames unambiguously assign culpability; they rigidly 
diagnose problems and prescribe fixed solutions, which in turn inhibits joint, flexible
problem-solving collaboration. The political level at which such organizations tend to
operate and their cognitive frames determine their competencies in the strategies of
mobilization, persuasion, and threats. Also, psychological sources of solidarity and
motivation often prevent them from transforming their cognitive frames and strategies
into collaborative forms of governance.
How might adversarial countervailing power overcome these obstacles and be rede-
ployed in collaborative contexts? How might actors who are accustomed to adversarial
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conflicts dramatically transform their cognitive frames and collaborate to formulate
creative solutions? Fung and Wright (2003) posit that collaborative countervailing power
will not be produced by supportive public policies, existing adversarial organizations,
or even well-designed collaborative procedures in and of themselves. The dynamic
whereby adversarial countervailing power is transformed into a collaborative one,
however, is still vague and not understood clearly.
This article explores the dynamic of power transformation by combining the theory
of trust building and the theory of power in collaborative governance. The next section
addresses power dynamics in collaborative governance. The existence of adversarial
countervailing power may manifest itself as distrust among the parties. Thus, the theory
of trust building is considered in the following section to understand the relationships
between power balancing and the trust-building cycle, and the article posits that power-
balancing prenegotiation for collaborative design may work as a catalytic starter for
establishing a trust-building loop through which the transformation of countervailing
power may follow accordingly. In order to test the proposed dynamic of power trans-
formation, this article delves into the case of the Shi-Hwa Sustainable Development
Committee, a local experiment of collaborative governance on a land-use planning
and environmental management in South Korea.
POWER IN COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
Facing the problem of power imbalances in collaborative governance, scholars 
and practitioners often suggest incomplete and even naive solutions. New governance
proponents, whose orientation is mostly macro, implicitly suggest that gross imbalances
of power among stakeholders can only be neutralized by certain collaborative institutional
designs, such as the devolvement of decision-making power to local experimental
deliberative groups (Fung & Wright, 2003). On the other hand, others who concentrate
on what goes on inside the collaborative procedure argue that so long as dialogue is
properly and fairly organized at the procedural level, consensus can be reached
(Faysse, 2006; Steins & Edwards, 1999). Criticizing both macro- and micro approaches
for not devoting systematic attention to pervasive problems of power imbalances, 
the proponents of so-called critical vision advise weak parties to reject participatory
collaborative governance, since it is almost impossible to overcome power imbalances
and very hard to build robust collaborative institutions (Edmunds & Wollenberg,
2001).
Understanding how power relations shape the process of collaborative governance
and outcomes may improve the quality of research on the effectiveness of power-
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balancing strategies. However, little theory exists to guide conveners, neutral practitioners,
participants, and researchers in understanding power in collaborative governance
(Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Constructing a comprehensive framework to describe
power in collaborative governance is not a simple task for a few reasons.
First, researchers are overwhelmed by myriad sources of power informed by a wide
range of structural, relational, and cognitive factors and often inconsistent descriptions
of power attributes and strategies (Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Mooney, 1984). Although a
few important efforts were made by negotiation researchers to provide comprehensive
but parsimonious framework on bargaining power (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Fisher
& Ury, 1981; Yukl & Tracey, 1992; Kim et al., 2005), much work remains to be done to
provide an adequate conceptualization of power dynamics in collaborative governance
in the public sector.
Second, power is a matter of individual’s subjective rather than objective perception,
interpretation, and assessment of contexts or facts. And such subjective judgment is
also a function of preferences, experiences, values, and how information is processed
(Bacharach & Lawler, 1976; Leap & Grigsby, 1986). Consequently, it is almost impos-
sible to construct a theoretical link between observable objective contexts as power
sources and outcomes of observed power strategies without considering individual
parties’ power perceptions. In other words, different parties in the same objective 
circumstances may perceive and utilize their powers differently. Thus, in explaining
power dynamics, any theory about power in collaborative governance should adequately
deal with the role of individuals’ perceptions of power.
Third, a few scholars have recently argued that a purely zero-sum, resource-based
view of power in a competitive sense is inadequate in collaborative contexts (Fisher &
Ury, 1981). Fung and Wright (2003) propose that the adversarial characteristics of
countervailing power, though not easily converted to collaborative ones, should be
transformed into collaborative countervailing power for collaborative purposes. Huxham
and Vangen (2005) describe three types of orientation to power—“power over” 
(oriented toward one’s own interests) “power to” (oriented toward mutual interests)
and “power for” (oriented toward the interests of others)—and suggest that “power
over” can be transformed into “power to,” and/or “power for” in order to advance the
joint efforts of the collaboration. Such propositions indicate that understanding power
in collaborative governance requires a dynamic model of power transformation.
Sources of Power
This article simplifies complex sources of power in collaborative governance, dividing
them into four categories: 1) institutional arrangements and contexts, 2) solidarity-
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based countervailing coalitions, 3) structure and design of the process, and 4) personal
cognitive, analytic, and communicative capacity. The four sources of power can be
sorted out according to three dimensions: controllability, deliberativeness, and where
the power source is located relative to the collaborative process (see table 1).
Controllability refers to the degree to which the parties can control the sources of
power. Some sources of power, such as the legislation of favorable regulations, are
usually beyond the control of the participants. Deliberativeness in the form of personal
communicative capacity is a source of power that is inherently associated with the
process. The sources of power in collaborative governance occupy various locations
relative to the process. Some sources exist outside the process and others inside or on
the boundary of the process.
Institutional Arrangements and Contexts Outside the Process
Some sources of power are embedded in institutional arrangements outside a 
collaborative governance process, or “away from the table” (Lax & Sebenious, 1985).
Those include legal provisions, regulations, and administrative procedures that allocate
asymmetric power to the parties by effecting outside alternative courses of action by
which they may address the issues. Technical, economic, or legal circumstances may
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Table 1. Sources of Power in Collaborative Governance
Controllability









Location structure and 
boundary design of process 
of process established through 
prenegotiation
personal cognitive, 
inside and analytic, 
process communicative 
capacity 
also provide sets of possible alternative strategies that parties can draw on in problem
solving. Those influential sources of power are usually nondeliberative, located outside
the process, and beyond the control of the participants (Holzinger, 2001).
For example, some environmental laws in the United States, such as the Clean Air
Act of 1970 and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, have citizen-suit provisions 
that entitle a private citizen to bring a lawsuit against another citizen, corporation, or
government body for engaging in conduct prohibited by the statute (Babich, 1995).
Potential lawsuits from citizens against usually strong parties, such as corporations 
or government agencies, often induce them to consider negotiation or collaborative
procedures, such as the Habitat Conservation Plan (Thomas, 2003).
Solidarity-Based Countervailing Coalition
Solidarity-based countervailing power, which is another source of nondeliberative
power, usually arises from a politically and socially organized group. And explanations
of how such groups come to be and their strength are separated from, although linked
to, the shape of collaborative institutions themselves and are contingent on factors that
give rise to interest groups and social movements (Fung & Wright, 2003). The bases
of solidarity-based countervailing power are shared constructions of political meaning
and psychological connection between and support from the members of the group.
Since conflict provides the principal impetus for mobilization and solidarity (Sagoff,
2004), the very idea of solidarity-based countervailing power suggests the use of
threats rather than collaboration to settle issues in dispute, and their capacities are well
adapted to adversarial approaches, such as demonstrations, campaigns, petitions, and
litigations (Fung & Wright, 2003).
Power Generated from the Structure of Collaborative Governance
The design and structure of the collaboration process can provide opportunities for
the exercise of power (Booher, 2004; Purdy, 2012; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). For
example, decisions regarding the collaboration’s agenda provide a very important
opportunity for the use of power (Altheide, 1998, Eden & Huxham, 2001) since they
reveal who has a legitimate claim to participate in the process (Gray, 1989). In addition
who will participate in the collaboration as potential allies, which facts should be
appealed to in finding solutions, and how decisions will be made are also related to the
question of who has power to control the process. Thus, the design and structure of the
collaboration process signals which participants hold the most power and who will
take credit for the joint effort (Purdy, 2012; Vangen & Huxham, 2003).
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Fung and Wright (2003) maintain that the specific structures of institutions of collab-
oration are themselves the result of endogenous political processes. Their structures
hinges on configurations of institutional settings and nondeliberative social forces 
outside collaborative governance. For example, when countervailing power is weak,
concentrated parties control the rules of collaboration in such a way as to favor their
interests by limiting the collaboration agenda, restricting the range of participants, and
reducing collaborative input to mere advice (Fung & Wright, 2003).
Negotiation and dispute resolution literature likewise emphasizes the influence of
prenegotiation in designing the process in such a way as to encourage participation
(Cormick, 1989; Saunders, 1991). Unless participants feel it is possible to reconcile
their differences fairly given the balance of power among the parties that is manifested
in the structure of the collaborative process, they may not be interested in participating
in collaboration or negotiation.
Personal Capacity Inside the Collaborative Process
One of the main arguments against collaborative governance and deliberation is that
even fair rules, regulations, and well-designed collaborative procedures will not in and
of themselves balance power among participants completely since individual cognitive,
analytic capacities can introduce pervasive asymmetry (Edmunds & Wollenberg,
2001; Sanders, 1997).
These arguments mostly concern how such asymmetries influence deliberation
inside the collaboration procedure. For example, some participants are inherently better
than others at articulating their arguments in reasonable terms and creating persuasive
memos and documents (Phillips & Hardy, 1997; Sanders, 1997). Systematically and
materially underrepresented and disadvantaged groups, such as racial minorities and
poorer people, are less likely to have learned such communication skills and to have a
wide range of knowledge, expertise and information (Gunton & Day, 2003; Lasker &
Weiss, 2003; Warner, 2006). Discourse and prescriptive negotiation theories also point
to the deployment of various individual capacities, such as active listening skills, the
ability to control emotions, and creativity, and the use of external standards of legitimacy
inside the negotiation process as important sources of negotiation power (Fisher &
Ury, 1981; Holzinger, 2001).
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DYNAMIC MODEL OF TRANSFORMATION OF COUNTERVAILING
POWER IN COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
This section proposes a dynamic model of the transformation of countervailing
power in collaborative governance as shown in figure 1 below. Adversarial counter-
vailing power, built up by weak parties who tap into many sources of power, often 
creates a mutually destructive stalemate. Such policy deadlocks or failures caused by
conventional adversarial approaches may help the parties see their interdependence
and provide the ultimate impetus for them to talk (Bryson et al., 2008; Futrell, 2003;
Weber, 2003; Zartman, 1989). Some scholars argue that such interdependency helps
stakeholders overcome any prehistory of antagonism and build trust (Ansell & Gash,
2008; Imperial, 2005; Logsdon, 1991; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Yaffee & Wondolleck,
2003).
However, seeking a way out of a policy deadlock is not always adopted and turned
into successful collaboration. Even if the parties seize the moment and sit together at
the table, they still may not trust each other (Weech-Maldonado & Merrill, 2000).
They may not be sure whether the other parties truly desire to collaborate, want to
delay the process, or use collaboration as window-dressing (Futrell, 2003). They may
participate in a collective forum not because they have a vision of what they might
accomplish through collaboration but because they worry about what might happen
without their participation (Susskind & McMahon, 1985). Although the hypothesis
that a policy deadlock may be a necessary context to initiate a trust-building cycle is
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Figure 1. Dynamic Model of Transformation of Countervailing Power in Collaborative Governance
compelling, it is not enough to explain what happens inside the process to build trust.
Also, a prolonged conflict is likely to create a vicious cycle of suspicion, distrust,
and stereotyping (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Thus, the lack of trust or distrust among the
parties is a common starting point for a collaborative process (Vangen & Huxham,
2003; Weech-Maldonado & Merrill, 2000), and trust building is the most difficult
component in collaborative process among historically antagonistic and distrusted
organizations (Murdock et al., 2005). How to build trust in such an environment and
how to sustain it during the collaborative process are very important matters in practice.
Transforming adversarial countervailing power into a collaborative one also requires
a dramatic shift of the cognitive frames through which the parties understand the political
world, articulate solutions to problems, and mobilize support for themselves. Moreover,
transformed cognitive frames require different sets of competencies and skills as shown
in table 2 (Fung & Wright, 2003; Putnam, 2004).
The difficulty of transformation may imply that the transformation process should
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Table 2. Differences between Adversarial and Collaborative Countervailing Power
Sources and Forms of Adversarial Sources and Forms of Collaborative 
Countervailing Power Countervailing Power
relies on threats and mobilization
maximizes interests by seeking to get the 
government to rule in its favor, typically through
bargaining process






strategies of communication, information 
provision, and persuasion to mobilize broad 
popular support and mount pressure
Cognitive Frames:
informed by injustice frames (inequity and 
disrespect)
assigns culpability (incriminates adversaries)
prescribes simple and direct policy solutions




discovers the broadest commonality of 
interests rather than mobilizes maximum 
support for given interests
encourages mutual acknowledgment and 
appreciation
Political Scale:




depends on sustained and deep cooperation
between diverse parties
discovers and tests hypotheses about the
complex causes of public problems
offers more flexible diagnoses
be gradual or incremental. And much literature hints that an incremental trust-building
process through power-balancing management may be related to the transformation 
of cognitive frames embedded in countervailing power. Huxham and Vengen (2000)
suggest that coming to terms with the issues of perceived power imbalances is likely
to require many cycles of the trust-building cycle. Norris-Tirrell and Clay (2010) argue
that concern for others’ interests is most likely to emerge under conditions of trust.
Vengen and Huxham (2013) posit that a high level of mutual trust between parties could
increase the satisfaction level them all even if one party is dominant. Thus, once a trust-
building cycle in a collaborative process is successfully launched in a well-intentioned
way, the transformation of countervailing power is likely to start accordingly.
Much literature suggests that trust building is a cyclical process in which trust is
built incrementally with each positive outcome (Huxham, 2003; Imperial, 2005) and
that a “small wins” approach (Bryson, 1988), which relies on successful implementation
of low-risk initiatives, is a pragmatic way to initiate a trust building loop (Das & Teng,
1998; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). However, initiating a trust-building cycle with the
small-wins approach requires at least certain amount willingness of the parties to take
the risk required to set the process in motion (Webb, 1991; Vangen & Huxham, 2003).
In order to launch the trust-building cycle in a context of distrust among the parties,
there have to be conditions under which the trust-building cycle could be initiated. The
proposed model in this article suggests two background conditions and one dynamic
factor for initiating a trust-building cycle through which the transformation of counter-
vailing power can happen. Fung and Wright (2003) suggest two conditions as sources
of collaborative countervailing power. First, locally organized entities with deep local
knowledge are more likely to give up adversarial modes of participation for collaborative
ones than groups operating at broader levels. Second, political leaders may champion
participatory collaboration to create venues for problem solving.
If these two conditions are present, then the parties will be in a position to negotiate
the structure of collaboration in such a way as to manage power imbalances, which can
serve as the seed for initiating the trust-building loop. The structure of collaboration,
such as the range of participants, the scope of agendas, and the purpose of collaboration,
is closely related to trust building since in it reside the inherent sources of power with
which the parties may want to protect and advance their interests (Eden & Huxham,
2001; Huxham & Vangen, 2000). Consequently, perceived power imbalances embedded
in the structure of collaboration are likely to produce a perception of weakness that in
turn induces a perception of vulnerability, making the weak parties reluctant to trust
powerful ones and defensive about their own agendas (Lane & Bachmann, 1998;
Lawler, 1992; Vangen & Huxham, 2003).
Thus, managing power imbalances in an effort to design the structure of collabora-
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tion is very important for initiating a trust-building loop when there is lack of trust or
distrust among the parties from the beginning. Trust requires forming expectations
about the way others will contribute to achieving the collaborative outcome (Lane &
Bachmann, 1998) and the willingness to take the risk that other parties may take
advantage of collaborative efforts with opportunistic behaviors (Vangen & Huxham,
2003). Thus, agreeing on the structure of collaboration in advance helps the parties to
form necessary expectations and reduce the risk inherent in collaboration (Gulati,
1995). In doing so, the parties may create the trust necessary to initiate trust-building
loop with a small-wins approach thereafter.
TESTING THE MODEL WITH A CASE STUDY
This section tests the proposed dynamic model of the transformation of counter-
vailing power in collaborative governance by considering the case of the Shi-Hwa
Sustainable Development Committee as an example of successful collaborative gover-
nance in balancing development and environment in Korea. This case is very appropriate
for testing the model since the parties involved in development projects in the Lake
Shi-Hwa region were successful in transforming an almost ten-year adversarial conflict
into a collaborative one, despite the lack of trust among actors. I introduce the case by
describing the Korean context as a backdrop to it. For the case study, this article draws
on secondary sources, such as academic journal articles and news articles. In addition,
key stakeholders, such as a number of leading members of the committee were inter-
viewed face-to-face occasionally at academic conferences and training programs for
conflict resolution during 2010 and 2012. These interviews made it possible to glean
their perceptions of the collaborative process and trace their cognitive frameworks
through it.
Background
South Korea achieved rapid economic development with a “grow first, clean up
later” approach that was propagandized by authoritarian military regimes beginning in
the mid-1960s (Moon & Lim, 2003) and saw the burgeoning of civic rights during the
democratic consolidation that subsequently emerged. Serious environmental fatigue
stemming from rapid economic development can trigger social movements on the 
part of environmental groups and victimized citizens (Cotton, 1998), and this was the
case in Korea. Without facilitative leadership and a regulatory framework to support
collaboration, however, conventional balancing processes with respect to sustainability
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have been excessively adversarial in Korea due to confrontation between the dominant
paradigm of economic development and the emergence of countervailing power through
interest group politics, litigation, and social mobilization. Conditions thus obtain in
Korea that make it possible to conduct a sort of “natural experiment” to analyze how
to transform adversarial countervailing power to collaborative countervailing one.
Lake Shi-Hwa and Regional Development Plans
Lake Shi-Hwa is an artificial lake on the west coast of Republic of Korea.1 The
12.6 kilometer-length tidal embankment was built between 1986 and 1994 as a means
of sealing off the mouths of the bay (figure 2) so as to reclaim 133.7 square kilometers
of land for agricultural use and industrial complexes and create 42.3 square kilometers
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Figure 2. Lake Shi-Hwa and Surrounding Region
Source: Lake Shi-Hwa Management Committee
1. Shi-Hwa was named after the first syllables of the names of the two cities, Shi-Heung and
Hwa-Sung, that surround the lake.
for a freshwater lake to irrigate the Shi-Hwa region. This ambitious reclamation project
was the byproduct of a government decision in 1977 to designate the area adjacent to
the bay as a special development area, where An-San, a new town, and Pan-Wol, an
industrial complex, would be built to which people and factories would be moved
from Seoul in order to alleviate the overpopulation problem in the capital city (Lee,
2012).
Lake Shi-Hwa Environmental Disaster
After the lake was finally sealed off in 1994, its water quality began rapidly
degrading due to an increasing pollution load from residential areas and industrial
complexes and the lack of wastewater treatment facilities. A large-scale seawall was
constructed to remove the mudflat, which reduced the natural pollution-absorption
capabilities of the lake while blocking seawater inflow. In 1997, Lake Shi-Hwa became
a symbol of environmental disaster in Korea. Water pollution of the lake raised social
and environmental concerns, which led to conflict between the government and angry
residents. Apart from water pollution, air pollution from factory stacks and noisome odor
were serious problems to the residents near the lake.
Successful Collaborative Governance
Miraculously, Lake Shi-Hwa and adjacent regions turned themselves from a case
of environmental disaster into a model for sustainable development relatively in a
short period of time. The annual mean chemical oxygen demand concentration in the
streams flowing through the industrial complex near Lake Shi-Hwa decreased from
1,970 parts per million in 2004 to 17 parts per million in 2006. And the chemical oxygen
demand of Lake Shi-Hwa improved significantly to 2 parts per million in the same
year. As the water quality improved, the ecosystem in the region was also revived with
more migratory birds and fishes. The number of complaints of bad odors decreased
from 630 cases in 2004 to 190 in 2008.
Improvements in environmental quality were made through the implementation of
the agreements on water and air quality improvement roadmaps and regional develop-
ment plans that the Shi-Hwa Sustainable Development Committee hammered out in
negotiations and deliberation over a four-year period, from 2004 to 2008. A total of 38
members participated in the committee, including 4 local politicians as board members,
2 joint chairs, 12 government officials from central and local governments, 4 officials
from public corporations, and 16 members of the Shi-Hwa Coalition.
The committee generated lots of creative ideas for developing the area in more sus-
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tainable ways. For example, they agreed to establish and conserve a habitat for migratory
birds in reclaimed lands and an eco-network in the newly developed city for wild 
animals to move safely in. They formulated stringent guidelines for constructing envi-
ronmentally friendly golf courses around the new city. They designated a site of
dinosaur egg fossils for eco-tourism and sought to conserve narrow-mouth frogs by
moving their habitat into another appropriate region. They also agreed to earmark all
the revenue from regional development projects for environmental management plans to
improve air and water quality in that region. Acknowledging the efforts of the committee
and its tangible outcomes, in 2008, the government institutionalized it, turning what
started as an ad-hoc voluntary process into a permanent, legitimate, and official decision-
making body.
Transformation of Adversarial Countervailing Power into a Collaborative 
One in the Shi-Hwa Sustainable Development Committee
This section applies the proposed model of power transformation to the case of the
Shi-Hwa Sustainable Development Committee and focuses on the relationships among
power, trust building, and transformation.
Adversarial Countervailing Power against the Government
Local civil societies, including environmental groups in the region, had over time
built up enough substantial countervailing power to create policy deadlocks. Their first
source of power was a solidarity-based countervailing coalition that relied on mostly
mass rallies and other public activities.
After the Ministry of Environment discharged polluted water from Lake Shi-Hwa
into the sea in order to alleviate water pollution in the lake in 1996, tens of thousands
of fishes and shellfish died around the bay. Consequently, local fishermen and envi-
ronmental groups fiercely complained about the government decision. A number of
government agencies came up with various policy packages to address environmental
problems and development interests, but the citizens in the region likewise took
action: in 1999, 12 civil organizations in that region established a civic coalition and
began organizing systematic campaigns to challenge government decisions.
For example, on March 22, 1999, they convened a civil forum on Lake Shi-Hwa in
which 500 people participated to celebrate World Day for Water. They also organized
a workshop to formulate their own proposal that included construction of an ecopark
around Lake Shi-Hwa. They explored the area and incidentally found the fossils of
dinosaurs’ eggs in a reclaimed area. In 2000, they intentionally derailed official public
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hearings on a farmland development plan proposed by the Ministry of Environment
and organized a mass rally in front of the central government complex in Seoul.
The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries organized local forums that 24
local stakeholders participated in to establish a comprehensive management plan for
the region. However, the local forums excluded the coalition members. The Ministry
of Construction and Transportation also made an effort to create a comprehensive
management plan for Lake Shi-Hwa aimed at reclaiming more land by establishing
the Shi-Hwa Region Policy Council, whose members included central government
agencies, local governments, and public corporations. The council commissioned six
national think-tank institutes to formulate a comprehensive management plan for the
Lake Shi-Hwa region. The proposal outlined the Shi-Hwa Multi-Techno Valley project,
whose goal was to turn reclaimed areas into an industrial complex for cutting-edge
technology industries and venture companies as well as to establish tourism and
leisure sites. The Lake Shi-Hwa Coalition, however, criticized the proposal as another
deadly governmental blunder that would end up polluting Lake Shi-Hwa again. The
coalition blocked every step of the process. The public hearing on the proposal by the
Ministry of Construction and Transportation was not conducted properly due to the
protest of coalition members.
Role of Contexts outside the Process
Although adversarial countervailing power might pressure a government to consider
other options to address a problem than unitary, preemptive actions, pressure can also
come from contexts outside the process. The strong resistance from the Shi-Hwa
Coalition was accompanied by criticism of the government by politicians and the media
for its failure in managing water quality in Lake Shi-Hwa. Even the Board of Audit
and Inspection, a powerful independent body of the government, criticized the central
government agencies that were responsible for development projects and environmental
management. Those critiques from contexts the groups directly involved in challenging
the government weakened its power further.
Another meaningful change in the political realm that affected the government
agencies that contributed to the environmental disaster was President Roo Moo-hyun’s
introduction of a so-called participatory government that emphasized the value of 
participatory decision making. In addition, the new administration recruited civil leaders
into government positions. Thus, people affiliated with civil organizations were able to
connect with the senior bureaucrats of many government agencies. A new political
atmosphere might encourage government officials to try to make the decision-making
process more inclusive.
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Distrust among the Parties
When the Ministry of Construction and Transportation invited the Shi-Hwa Coalition
to hash out the problem in a new collaborative process, the coalition did not accept the
offer right away. Its members did not trust the government. They believed that water
quality improvement should be the priority, but the government argued that water
quality improvement and regional development should go hand in hand. Even though
the government promised that some portion of the revenues from regional development
would be earmarked for environmental management projects in Lake Shi-Hwa area,
the members of the Shi-Hwa Coalition suspected that the government would manipulate
them to agree to the project first and then change its stance and adopt a passive role in
environmental management.
Up-front Negotiation to Agree on the Structure of Collaboration
One of the reasons why the Shi-Hwa Coalition did not accept the offer from the
ministry right away was that an immediate acceptance might have weakened its 
solidarity as a coalition and signaled its weakness to the government. Although the
coalition realized that the water quality of the lake had not been improved at all
despite their efforts to tackle the problem through antigovernment campaigns, the
coalition did not see any other options but to maintain their adversarial stance because
they distrusted the government.
Even when the Shi-Hwa Coalition did finally accept the invitation from the ministry,
it proposed a few counterterms as conditions to begin any dialogue. First, a new col-
laborative working group should not limit participants and should be open to anyone
who wanted to participate. Although the government had tried to incorporate civilian
members into some phases of decision-making process, the members of the Shi-Hwa
Coalition had been excluded. Second, any decision should be arrived at by consensus
rather than a majority rule. Third, the dialogue should be transparent and open to the
public through a web page that would update information on meetings and would post
relevant data and even recorded transcripts from the meetings. Fourth, the Shi-Hwa
Coalition should be allowed to recommend any experts to the committee. Fifth, any
discussion should start from scratch. And sixth, all information about the government
project should be shared with participants of the committee in a timely manner (Hong
& Lee, 2008).
According to an interview with the leader of the Shi-Hwa Coalition who proposed
these terms to the government, the coalition did not expect that the Ministry of Con-
struction and Transportation would accept them. If the ministry had refused to accept
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the terms, that refusal could have been utilized as a rationale for the coalition to criti-
cize the government even more harshly. To the surprise of the coalition, however, the
government official from the ministry accepted all the terms. Although the coalition
members were suspicious because this was such an unusual move on the part of the
government, they decided to join in a new multistakeholder process called the Shi-
Hwa Sustainable Development Committee on January 16, 2004.
When the government official from the Ministry of Construction and Transporta-
tion proposed a new collaborative process and accepted all the preconditions set by the
Shi-Hwa Coalition as preconditions, he was criticized inside the government on the
grounds that accepting the terms might make the government look weak and signal
that the government had surrendered their own decision-making power mandated by
the law. The leaders of the Shi-Hwa Coalition who decided to participate in the
process were also under pressure from members of the Coalition who were afraid that
they might be co-opted or manipulated by the government.
At the first meeting of the Shi-Hwa Sustainable Development Committee, the 
participants introduced ground rules specifying and elaborating on the terms that the
Shi-Hwa Coalition had proposed. The chairman of the committee was the senior 
government official from the Ministry of Construction and Transportation for the first
couple of meetings. But later the senior official suggested that the committee should
have two joint chairpersons, one from the government and one from civil society. The
committee established three subgroups: one for air quality, one for water and the
ecosystem, and one for regional development planning. The chairperson for each of
the subgroups was selected by the Shi-Hwa Coalition, while government officials
served as facilitators. With this arrangement, the committee managed to achieve a 
balance of power between the government and civil society.
The up-front negotiation regarding the structure of the collaboration was critical to
its success. In the eyes of the coalition, the terms it had proposed had power-balancing
effect. The expectation that the process would be inclusive and transparent and that
consensus rather than majority rule would decide the outcome of any decision made
the coalition feel less vulnerable and less distrustful and helped reduce the risk inherent
in collaboration that it exposed itself to in working with the government.
Small-Wins Approach to Trust Building and Power Transformation
At the early stage of the collaborative process, the members of the Shi-Hwa Coalition
could not fully trust the government. According to an interview with the leader of the
Shi-Hwa Coalition, however, trust between the government and the Shi-Hwa Coalition
members started being built up little by little when the members of the coalition saw
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that the government was indeed going to honor the terms the coalition had set. For
example, when the coalition requested copies of technical and administrative documents
about development projects from the Ministry of Construction and Transportation,
government officials sent all the relevant documents to it in a timely manner. Also, the
webpage of the Shi-Hwa Sustainable Development Committee through which the
public was able to access much information on its meetings increased the level of
transparency, which also contributed to building trust among its members.
Transformation from Mobilizing to Win to Solving Local Problems
One of the major transformations of the Shi-Hwa Coalition as adversarial counter-
vailing power was its decision to focus on local problem solving rather than coalition
building with other major environmental organizations whose headquarters were
located in the capital. Although it had the opportunity to form a coalition with these
major organizations, it decided instead to work only with its local members and focus
on its own local problems (Ma & Moon, 2012).
The leader of the coalition revealed in the interview that he was concerned that the
involvement of the major environmental groups from Seoul might lead the process
into deep-value-rooted conflict rather than problem-solving deliberation. The coalition
also believed that it could only trust the government participants to the extent that it
did not feel vulnerable and that working with large groups from the capital would
make it feel weaker. In addition, the coalition believed that its members were better
positioned to discuss local issues, as they possessed more information about what was
happening on the ground than the national groups in Seoul did.
Transformation from Culpability to Mutual Learning
Usually, the parties in adversarial relationships do not acknowledge each other’s
concerns but instead tend to criticize or attack them. Such interaction begets more
defensive and aggressive strategies. Acknowledging that conventional argumentative
processes had prevented each group from learning from the other the Shi-Hwa Sus-
tainable Development Committee sought to overcome this obstacle by holding special
sessions for mutual learning, so-called, learning without criticism” sessions (Lee &
Ahn, 2007).
The ground rules for these learning without criticism sessions were that no participant
should criticize another participant. Instead, the members were meant to just listen the
experts who presented conflicting views to the whole session and only speak to ask
these experts to clarifying questions. For example, during two-day sessions on the
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issue of environmentally friendly golf courses, the participants listened to experts
without raising any challenges, and the result was that they learned about the potential
risks of such golf courses and their impact on the region’s ecosystem and about ways
of designing golf courses and available technologies that could minimize the environ-
mental damage from building them. Over the first five years of the collaboration, the
Shi-Hwa Sustainable Development Committee held 35 learning sessions.
Transformation from Rigid Diagnoses to Flexible Joint Fact-Finding
The Ministry of Construction and Transportation proposed to develop 10.46 square
kilometers of reclaimed land for the Shi-Hwa Multi-Techno Valley Project. However,
the Shi-Hwa Coalition strongly argued that the ministry should reduce the size of the
development area to only 3 square kilometers. The participants could not resolve this
disagreement due to conflicting data and the opinions of a number of adversarial
experts. Thus, they agreed to commission a joint research project that experts from each
side would participate equally in to figure out the appropriate size of the development.
After a long-term study, the joint research team recommended that the government
should establish the Shi-Hwa Multi-Techno Valley Project on a 9.26 square kilometer
parcel. The size that the team proposed was slightly smaller than that originally
planned on by the government, but it was much larger than that suggested by the Shi-
Hwa Coalition. Significantly, the coalition members accepted the recommendation
from the joint research team, since their own experts had also participated in the joint
research process, from designing research questions to collecting data.
Challenges during the Process
The members of the Shi-Hwa Coalition who built trust incrementally and transformed
their cognitive framework from an adversarial one into practical problem-solving one
became deeply committed to the self-governance of the process, sensing that they
owned it, and they tried to maintain the momentum. Consequently, they could support
the agreement the parties arrived at at the end of the process. However, some members
were not satisfied with the outcome that would allow the government to establish
another industrial complex on the reclaimed area. Those members finally walked out
of the process, built another coalition with other sympathetic environmental groups, and
accused the Shi-Hwa Sustainable Development Committee of having been manipulated
by the government (Lee & Hong, 2009; Jun, 2011). But the fact that all major stake-
holders agreed on the decisions and that most of the local residents supported the
agreement enhanced the legitimacy of the agreement.
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CONCLUSION
Collaborative governance is an institutional arrangement that can improve the effec-
tiveness and legitimacy of public decision making. That experiments of collaborative
governance around various controversial issues arise voluntarily, transform adversarial
relationships into collaborative ones, and even produce tangible, positive outcomes
might be more of a miracle, however, than something we can take for granted.
This article has tried to test the framework of power transformation by considering
the case of the Shi-Hwa Sustainable Development Committee as a successful experiment
of collaborative governance whereby of adversarial countervailing power was trans-
formed into a collaborative one in balancing development and environment in Korea.
The framework is quite useful in explaining how an adversarial coalition that had battled
the government for more than 10 years could transform into very successful collaborative
one. Only when the Shi-Hwa Coalition as a locally organized group felt that power
among the parties was roughly had been balanced through up-front negotiation over
the structure of the collaborative process was it able to start incrementally gaining trust
in the government.
The results of this article may provide some guidance for decision makers and
practitioners who consider collaborative governance to be an alternative approach to
solving controversial problems but who find themselves in situations in which there
serious distrust among the parties owing to their perception of a serious power imbal-
ance. The key factor that may lead to successful collaborative governance is effective
power-balancing management, since power transformation can hinge on trust building,
which in turn depends on securing a balance of power.
Thus, scholars and practitioners need to have a clearer understanding of the mecha-
nisms and dynamics of power balancing in and around collaborative governance. If we
understand why certain parties perceive power imbalances, it will be easier to remedy
the problem. Taking into account how difficult or easy it is to controlling a given
power source, scholars and practitioners should focus on up-front negotiations over
the structure of collaborative governance as a more appropriate method for power
management when there is distrust among the parties but should also keep working to
change institutional arrangements in such a way as to secure a balance of power outside
the collaborative process.
This analytic framework may have a limitation in that it is not necessarily generaliz-
able. The proposed model was only tested with the single case of the Shi-Hwa Sustain-
able Development committee. However, there are many potential cases in Korea that
this model could be tested on, including controversies over where to site nuclear power
plants, high-level nuclear waste treatment facilities, and high-voltage transmission
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towers. Further research is necessary to determine whether the proposed model could
be applied to these cases.
Second, there may be other important factors that contribute to managing power
during the collaborative process. For example, the leadership of trusted facilitator or
mediator is widely considered to be critical in bringing parties to the table and in
empowering and representing weaker stakeholders through procedures that help put
stakeholders on an equal footing (Ozawa, 1993). Where incentives to participate are
weak, power and resources are asymmetrically distributed, and preexisting antagonisms
are strong, leadership becomes all the more important. In the case of the Shi-Hwa 
Sustainable Development Committee, there was no neutral third party, but further
study is needed to identify the potential role of facilitative leadership in the dynamic
model of transformation of countervailing power in collaborative governance.
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